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Asking people to provide global judgments, or trait reports, of their affective experience is a standard
method for assessing trait affective well-being, with countless applications in the social sciences. Trait
reports reflect numerous influences that generally go unnoticed. Although state affect is a highly
plausible candidate for such influences, this source of unwanted variance does not receive much attention
and is usually not controlled for in empirical studies. Using 100-day data from the COGITO study, we
provide direct and strong evidence that trait reports of affect depend on how people feel at the time they
provide the evaluations (i.e., their affective state). For example, participants experiencing more positive
affect on a specific day relative to their individual mean also provide more positive ratings of their global
affective experience. Furthermore, we found that current affect influences trait ratings in a surprisingly
differentiated way—those particular facets of affect that are more/less prevalent at a certain moment are
believed to occur more/less often in general. We stress the need for repeated observations within
individuals to estimate state contributions to standard assessments of trait affect, to distinguish between
state and trait in psychological assessment, and to achieve good indicators of affective experiences in the
social and medical sciences.
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Asking people about their affective experiences has countless
applications in the social sciences. In policy evaluations, for ex-
ample, economists and sociologists study affective experiences
(Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & Deaton, 2010). Affective experi-
ences also matter because they are linked to psychopathology
(Clark & Watson, 1991), personality (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar,
1998), and stress (Lazarus, 1999). Furthermore, psychologists ex-
amine the nature of the basic dimensions of affect (Carroll, Yik,
Russell, & Barrett, 1999). Some of this research is concerned with
stable individual differences in affect (i.e., traits), others with
states that reflect how a person feels at a given moment. Here we
provide direct and strong evidence that the distinction between
measures of state and trait affect is blurred when single-occasion
state and trait reports of affect are used. This is in accordance with
theoretical expectations and some prior empirical evidence that
have had surprisingly little impact, as single-occasion trait reports
continue to be the norm. Our findings have implications for all
research traditions mentioned above.
Trait-level affect is often obtained on single occasions with
items such as, “How happy were you during the last year?” Such
trait reports do not deliver accurate estimates of actual experiences
as experiential information is no longer present in memory and
inferences guided by information from episodic and semantic
memory are required (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Schwarz, 2007). In
fact, the construction of trait affect is influenced by beliefs about
one’s emotions and ideal affect (Barrett, 1997; Ross, 1989; Scol-
lon, Howard, Caldwell, & Ito, 2009), by particular moments of
emotional episodes (e.g., the peak and the end of an emotional
episode; Fredrickson, 2000), and by the motivation to keep un-
wanted material out of consciousness (e.g., anxiety provoking
thoughts; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).
Reports of current state affect, instead, attenuate memory biases
and represent actual experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Yet
state and trait affect capture aspects of each other and, therefore,
their measures are, to some extent, confounded. On the one hand,
state affect is predictable by traits that determine the propensity of
affect occurrence (i.e., neuroticism; Watson & Clark, 1984). Like-
wise, stable beliefs may influence state affect because people hold
specific notions on how situations influence emotions (Ross,
1989). On the other hand, state affect should also impact trait
reports, as a vast body of research on mood-congruent cognition
seems to imply (Bower & Forgas, 2000). Two mechanisms are
discussed in this context. First, affective states increase the acces-
sibility of equally valenced memories as affect is part of associa-
tive networks (Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978).
Being in a good mood, for example, may trigger mainly happy
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memories and this would lead to an overestimation when evalu-
ating trait affect. Second, concurrent feelings serve an informative
function for global judgments—when forming a judgment, people
draw on their affective experiences as a source of information
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). The evidence for such effects is broad,
including, for example, effects of the weather on reports of life
satisfaction or of induced mood on interpersonal attraction and
evaluative judgments (Gouaux, 1971; Schwarz & Clore, 1983;
Yeung & Wyer, 2004).
These insights on confounds between state and trait affect
render it very likely that single-occasion evaluations of traits are
biased by current states. Two studies with several global well-
being measures as outcome variables even provide first evidence
for such a link (Eid & Diener, 2004; Eid, Notz, Steyer, & Sch-
wenkmezger, 1994). Yet, single-occasion evaluations of traits are
often used without concern and studies seem to ignore state affect
as a rather obvious confounding variable. Hence, this study pur-
sues two goals. First, we demonstrate the contribution of state
affect to trait reports of affect with a particularly well-suited study
design. Second, we show how this effect is global (e.g., feeling
relatively good predicts relatively positive evaluations of trait
affect) and specific (those particular facets of affect that are
more/less prevalent at the moment are believed to occur more/less
often in general).
Empirical Approaches to State–Trait Associations
Although many studies have been conducted on affect state–trait
associations, the majority does not necessarily imply that momen-
tary state affect as occurring in daily life has an impact on global
affect ratings. Experimental studies that use mood induction pro-
cedures (e.g., sad movies) showed state effects on global judg-
ments of well-being. These findings may not generalize to natural
variations of mood in daily life because the latter may be more
restricted than variation elicited by induction procedures. Like-
wise, it is unclear whether systematic main effects of good and bad
weather on judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) generalize to
natural variations of mood. Such effects may also be stronger than
effects of state affect that reflects a blend of influences, including
weather, stress, and diurnal rhythms (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuer-
linckx, 2010). Moreover, there are studies reporting effects of
natural moods on judgments (e.g., more positive judgments in
those individuals reporting better mood), but they mostly measured
mood and judgments on single occasions. Therefore, they reflect
between-person associations rather than state effects because of
trait variance in state affect measures—the “rose-colored glasses”
are dispositional rather than situational (Mayer & Hanson, 1995;
Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995). More generally, findings on
high associations between state and trait affect measures at single
occasions are uninformative regarding the issue of state effects on
trait ratings because the effects are bidirectional—state measures
capture trait components and vice versa (Watson & Clark, 1984).
Taken together, it is highly conceivable that affective states in
daily life impact on global evaluations on affect, but the majority
of former research related to this issue has shortcomings (e.g.,
affect was experimentally induced, state effects on judgments were
not separable from trait effects). A methodologically adequate
empirical approach would require repeated measurements in order
to separate state and trait components and to study intraindividual
relations. The few studies conducted in this vein have revealed
intraindividual relations between natural mood variation and judg-
ments both in patients (depressive symptoms covaried with mem-
ory valence; Clark & Teasdale, 1982) and in a nonclinical sample,
where mood predicted the estimation of positive and negative
event occurrence (Mayer & Hanson, 1995). Finally, Eid and col-
leagues (Eid et al., 1994; Eid & Diener, 2004) simultaneously
assessed momentary and trait affective well-being on multiple
occasions and showed that ratings of trait well-being are not
independent from momentary mood. Thus, although sparse in
number, there is empirical evidence for the highly plausible claim
that affective states bias global judgments of well-being. Both
theoretical plausibility and empirical evidence seem to have been
largely ignored by researchers. In view of the importance of the
issue of state effects on global judgments, this study’s first goal is
to provide convincing evidence that trait affect reports are influ-
enced by momentary mood.
State–Trait Confounds: How Specific Are the Effects?
As a second goal, and as a new contribution to the literature, we
examined how comprehensive the confounding of states and traits
is. Ratings of trait affect and state affect result in profiles, that is,
the patterns across items belonging to the same construct (e.g.,
how nervous, upset, and afraid are distributed around the average
level of negative affect; Figure 1). Three major profile character-
istics are commonly distinguished: its elevation (the mean across
scores), its scatter (the standard deviation within a profile), and its
shape (the pattern of peaks and valleys; Cattell, 1949; Cronbach &
Gleser, 1953; Furr, 2008). We examined whether state–trait con-
founds include both, mean levels and the shape of the profile.
The assumptions formulated so far were concerned with eleva-
tion, or mean level confounds—concurrent good mood should
result in generally higher ratings of trait affect, which we refer to
as global or general in the following. Importantly, there are good
reasons to also expect a more specific effect, in particular, a
confound of state and trait shapes. Trait and state shapes are not
necessarily alike. Shapes at the trait level are determined by stable
individual characteristics. Individuals differ regarding the proba-
bility of experiencing negative and positive emotions, and these
differences are related to personality (neuroticism and extraver-
sion; e.g., Costa & McCrea, 1980). Individuals high in the dispo-
sition negative affect are more likely to experience sadness, anger,
and fear than those low in negative affect. In factor analytic terms,
the levels on the dispositions toward positive and negative emo-
tions (i.e., factor scores of persons on the latent factors) determine
the extent to which sadness or anger are experienced. Individuals
likely vary regarding their experience of specific facets of affect at
the trait level, as should become apparent in their trait shapes (e.g.,
some persons’ high level of neuroticism might be primarily char-
acterized by depressed mood, others’ by anxiousness). However,
given a general proneness to experience negative and positive
states, the trait shapes within individuals should be relatively flat.
Findings on relatively high and homogeneous factor loadings on
trait negative affect and positive affect factors in factor analytical
studies are supportive of this view (e.g., Watson, Clark, & Telle-
gen, 1988).
Shapes at the state level should differ from trait shapes because





































































































941TRAIT AND STATE AFFECT
more differentiated at the state than at the trait level because of the
specific content of situations. For example, situations potentially
eliciting negative affect include a dentist appointment, interper-
sonal tensions, and public transportation problems, and those prob-
ably elicit phenomenologically different affective responses (Zel-
enski & Larsen, 2000). Thus, in a specific situation, a person may
experience either sadness or anger, independent of his or her
average tendency to experience these facets of affect. The more
strongly situation-driven shape of state affect should therefore be
distinguishable from the more strongly personality-determined
shape of trait affect. Recent evidence from experience-sampling
studies is supportive of this view. For example, Wilhelm and
Schoebi (2007) investigated the structure of affect within and
between individuals. They revealed that a two-factor structure best
described the between-person structure and a three-factor structure
best described the within-structure. Thus, the within-person struc-
ture was more differentiated than the between-person structure
(see also Brose, Voelkle, Lövdén, Lindenberger, & Schmiedek,
2013; Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen, & Nezlek, 2005; Zelenski &
Larsen, 2000). Relatedly, Bleidorn and Peters (2011) revealed a
more negative correlation between positive and negative affect and
lower internal consistencies at the within- than at the between-
person level. Both may reflect the situational variations and
situation-specific affective responding that are relevant for struc-
tural relations at the within-person level.
In summary, theoretical considerations and empirical find-
ings speak for distinguishable affect shapes at the state and trait
level. Confounding state and trait measures thus also matters for
findings on shapes. The more measures of state and trait affect
are confounded, the more similar the shapes of state and trait
affect should be. That is, current affect may have a specific
effect in the sense that a currently particularly relevant facet is
evaluated as more relevant in trait ratings. Such blurring of
shapes can thus restrict conclusions about the trait and state
structures of affect.
The Present Study
This study aims to provide direct and strong evidence for the
claim that the distinction between state and trait affect, assessed on
single occasions, is blurred. Mean level associations and associa-
tions of shapes were taken into consideration because we expected
that confounds may not only be global, but also specific in the
sense that the more relevant aspects of state affect would also be
evaluated as more relevant in general. Evidence for a blurred
distinction would have important implications for affect assess-
ment and for interpretations of numerous findings in the literature.
This study’s design (see Figure 2) and its methodological approach
provide a unique opportunity to demonstrate linkages between
states’ and traits’ mean levels, but also to go beyond previous
research by investigating shape effects. Affect trait reports and
Figure 1. Three profiles of 10 negative affect items of one individual. By profile, we mean the pattern across
items belonging to the same construct (e.g., how nervous, upset, and afraid are distributed around the average
level of negative affect). In the analyses, we focus on the mean levels (elevation) and shape (peaks and valleys)
of the profiles. The three profiles emerged from the assessment of trait report affect and state affect on one
occasion at pretest as well as from item aggregation (separately for each item) across 100 subsequent occasions
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Study design and measures of state and trait affect in the
COGITO study. Affect trait reports and state affect were collected at the
same occasion. Subsequently, state affect was measured on 100 occasions
in the micro-longitudinal study phase; item-specific averages across the





































































































942 BROSE, LINDENBERGER, AND SCHMIEDEK
state affect were collected on the same occasion. Subsequently,
state affect was measured on 100 occasions in the microlongitu-
dinal study phase. Hence, we were able to form an aggregated
state measure (i.e., the average across 100 occasions) which rep-
resents individual differences in the experience of affective states.
By means of this aggregated state measure we were able to control
for individual differences in the state measure when determining
the contribution of state affect to trait reports, which is essential in
view of trait components in the state measure (see above). Shape
associations between traits and states were estimated by a specific
use of multilevel modeling, as will be explained below.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The COGITO study is a microlongitudinal study in which 101
younger and 103 older adults participated in about 120 days of
assessments of cognitive performance and daily life experiences
(Schmiedek, Lövdén, & Lindenberger, 2010). The sample of the
current investigation consisted of 90 younger (20–31 years) and 90
older (65–80 years) adults from this study. The state measure was
added shortly after data collection started and was, therefore, only
available for this smaller number of participants. Incentives varied
between 1.450 and 1.950 Euro, depending on the pace of study
completion. All sessions were carried out from Monday to Satur-
day between 8:00 and 19:00 h. Tasks and questionnaires were
computerized. The total number of sessions per person in the
microlongitudinal study phase (see Figure 2) ranged from 87 to
107 (M 101). Information on state affect is available for all these
sessions. More information on the COGITO study is provided in
Schmiedek, Lövdén, and Lindenberger (2010).
Measures
Trait affect. Evaluations of trait positive and negative affect
(PA and NA) were assessed with 20 items of the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). At pretest, participants rated how often they had experi-
enced each facet of affect over the last year. An 8-point answering
scale was used (0  not at all to 7  very often). We henceforth
refer to this measure as trait report.
State affect and aggregated state affect. The same 20 PANAS
items were used to assess state PA and NA. At all study occasions,
participants rated their momentary affect on an 8-point scale (0 
does not apply at all to 7  applies very well). The responses to the
state measure given on the same day on which the trait report measure
was administered were particularly relevant for the analyses. They are
henceforth referred to as state affect. In addition, the responses to the
state measure across the 100-days phase were aggregated by averag-
ing the responses of each participant separately for each item. The
resulting measure is henceforth referred to as aggregated state and
describes individual differences in the averaged state. Because the
states were averaged across 100 state reports, they are highly reliable
estimates. On the very first occasion of the study, the questionnaire
was administered with paper and pencil to familiarize participants
with the questions.
Statistical Analyses
The multilevel model. The research questions were addressed
in a multilevel modeling framework that can take account of the
nested data structure and testing associations at multiple levels of
the data (e.g., Snijders & Bosker, 1999). We expected trait affect
to be associated with state affect, and tested this hypothesis sep-
arately for positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). The
analytical approach is illustrated in Figure 3. Two levels were
considered (Figure 3, upper part; NA serves as an example here).
The different items measuring NA were Level-1 variables. These
are the repeated measurements that are nested within persons, at
Level 2 of the multilevel model. This type of multilevel model
belongs to the group of multivariate multilevel models (Snijders &
Bosker, 1999; “multivariate” refers to the fact that the criterion,
trait affect, was operationalized with multiple dependent variables,
i.e., the affect items). At first glance, one may regard the COGITO
study’s data structure in terms of days rather than items nested
within individuals. However, the measures used in this particular
investigation were not repeated across days. Trait affect was mea-
sured once at pretest, state affect was measured once on the same
day, and we used one aggregate across 100 days.
The criterion of the multilevel model is trait affect, in particular,
a vector of item-specific scores (Figure 3, lower part). There were
two Level-2 predictors in this model (person-level predictors): (a)
the mean level across items of the state measure and (b) the mean
level across items of the aggregated state measure. With these
Level-2 predictors, we tested whether individuals with higher
mean levels across items on the state measure had higher mean
levels in the criterion. There were also two Level-1 predictors in
this model (item-level predictors): the item vectors of (a) the state
measure and (b) the aggregated state measure. With these Level-1
predictors, we tested whether the deviation of item-specific scores
in the criterion (i.e., the shape of the profile) was similar to the
deviations of item-specific scores of the aggregated state measure
and of the state measure. Including the aggregated state measure
implies control for stable components in the state measure. If our
assumption that trait affect is infiltrated by state affect is correct,
we should find significant associations between trait reports and
state affect, over and above the associations between trait reports
and aggregated states.
The following statistical model was used to test our assumptions
(an equivalent model was tested for PA):
Level-1 Model
NA Trait Reportij0i1iNA State Shapeij
2iNA Agg State Shapeij eij
(1)
Level-2 Model
0i0001NA Statej02NA Agg Statej u0i (2)
1i10 u1i (3)
2i20 u2i. (4)
In these equations, the criterion NA Trait Report of person i on
item j is a function of the intercept, 0i. This intercept of person i
corresponds to the mean of trait report NA across all items. It is
further qualified at Level 2. Here, the intercept is predicted by the





































































































943TRAIT AND STATE AFFECT
items of aggregated (agg) state NA, 02. The first predictor, NA
State, reflects the hypothesis that the mean of people’s trait reports
(i.e., the elevation of the trait profile) is related to the mean of how
they feel at the specific moment of evaluating their traits (i.e., the
elevation of the state profile). The second predictor, NA Agg State,
was included to control for stable components of the NA state
measure and because of the assumption that the mean of people’s
trait reports is related to the mean of their actual experiences (i.e.,
the elevation of the aggregated state profile). These Level-2 pre-
dictor variables were grand-mean centered (the sample mean was
subtracted from the individuals’ scores). The random effect u0i in
the Level-2 equation reflects individual differences in the mean
value of trait report affect across items.
In the equations above, NA Trait Report is furthermore predicted
by the Level-1 variables, NA State Shape, 1i, and NA Agg State
Shape, 2i. These represent the shape of the state measure and the
shape of the aggregated state measure. Including these predictors
makes it possible to test whether the shape of trait reports is related
to the shape of state reports on the same day after controlling for
the shape of the aggregated state. As noted above, trait affect
entered the analyses as a vector of item-specific scores. Thus, the
Level-1 predictors make it possible to test whether the deviations
of the items j from the trait report’s mean across items are corre-
lated with the deviations of the items j from the mean across items
of the aggregated state measure, 1i, and the deviations of the
items j from the mean across the items of the state measure, 2i.
These Level-1 predictor variables were person-mean centered (i.e.,
deviations from this person’s mean). In the Level-2 equations of
1i and 2i, the terms u1i and u2i are added, implying that the two
slopes are random—the strength of the association between the
trait report shape and the aggregated state and state shape are
allowed to vary across persons. The parameter eij denotes residual
variance (variance in the criterion that cannot be explained by the
predictors). All analyses were conducted using SAS PROC
MIXED. The residual variance was modeled using a banded main
diagonal structure (the UN(1) covariance function in the RE-
PEATED statement), so that residual variance was estimated sep-
arately for each item.
Results
The results supported expectations that trait reports on single
occasions are influenced by the affective state on the assessment
day (see Table 1). Mean levels in state NA predicted mean levels
in trait report NA, and mean levels in state PA predicted mean
levels in trait report PA. This can be inferred from the significant
positive regression coefficients State mean level in Table 1. Thus,
when reporting trait PA, individuals who were in a better mood on
the pretest day provided higher ratings of how they had felt in
general over the last year. Likewise, when reporting trait NA,
individuals who were in a worse mood on the pretest day provided
higher ratings of trait NA over the last year. The inclusion of the
predictor Aggregated State mean level was the statistical control
for stable individual differences in the state measure, which rules
out that the associations of the trait report and the corresponding
current state are due to stable individual differences in the state
measure. The additional predictors in the model, State shape and
Aggregated State shape predicted the shape of trait report items
(i.e., which particular facets of affect were experienced more or
less than the mean across the items). The significant positive
Figure 3. Illustration of the nested data structure and of the statistical model that was tested: A two-level model
with items nested within individuals and person- and item-level predictors; two separate models were conducted





































































































944 BROSE, LINDENBERGER, AND SCHMIEDEK
coefficients in Table 1 reveal that the shapes of state PA and NA
as well as shapes of aggregated state PA and NA predicted trait
report shapes of PA and NA. That is, the pattern of how NA state
items varied around the mean levels of state NA predicted how NA
trait report items varied around the mean level of NA trait reports.
Likewise, the pattern of how PA state items varied around the
mean levels of state PA predicted how PA trait report items varied
around the mean level of PA trait reports. The simultaneous
inclusion of Aggregated State shape and State shape means that
after controlling for trait-like aspects in the state measure, the
shape of the state measure has unique predictive variance on
the trait report shape. That is, the shape of trait report affect is
more similar to the shape of momentary affect than to be expected
on the basis of stable components in the state measure, and this
speaks for a confounding of state and trait report shapes.
To determine the proportion of variance in trait reports uniquely
explainable by state affect, we calculated the increase in predicted
trait report variance when including state affect in the analysis
subsequent to aggregated states (i.e., state affect’s unique effect;
Figure 4). Multilevel models provide estimates of residual variance
components at the different levels, the so called Pseudo-R2 statistic
(Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Including meaningful Level-1 predic-
tors usually reduces residual variance at Level 1, and including
meaningful Level-2 predictors usually reduces variance at Level 2
(variance in the intercept). Running successive models thus allows
determination of the change in Pseudo-R2, similar to that of the
change in R2 in multiple regression analyses. These analyses were
done separately for the mean levels and for the shapes (at Level 1
and Level 2). Mean levels of state affect uniquely predicted mean
levels of trait reports, and shapes of state affect uniquely predicted
shapes of trait affect. Figure 4 also shows that substantial portions
of the predictive variance between state and aggregated state affect
are shared, suggesting that dispositions and everyday experiences
are linked.
The proportions of variance explained by states depicted in
Figure 4 refer to the total amount of variance in the mean level and
shape of the predictor. The proportion of variance explained by
states can also be seen in relation to the total amount of explained
variance. Relative to the total amount of variance predicted by
states and aggregated states, state affect explained between 14%–
38%, NA mean: 14%, NA shape: 38%, PA mean: 26%, PA shape:
29%. Thus, a considerable amount of explained variance in trait
reports was uniquely predicted by how participants felt when
evaluations were made.
Discussion
We showed that the distinction between common measures of
state and trait affect is blurred. Current affective states predict trait
reports, that is, how people evaluated their affective experiences in
general. Moreover, state reports at single occasions capture indi-
vidual differences in affective experiences. The identified con-
founds encompass global and specific effects: Not only does
feeling better on a particular occasion lead to above-average judg-
ments of trait affect; beyond this influence, dominating aspects of
current state affect are also judged as being more relevant in
general. That is, in addition to mean level effects that were also
identified in previous research, we showed effects of states’ shapes
on trait reports’ shapes. The effect of the specific (shape) compo-
nent indicates that current affect influences trait ratings in a sur-
prisingly differentiated way. It thus seems that momentary affect
Table 1
Prediction of Trait Report Affect by State and Aggregated State
Affect (Mean Level and Shape)
Negative affect Positive affect
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Fixed effects
Intercept 2.43 0.08 4.59 0.06
Aggregated state mean level 0.64 0.12 0.16 0.05
Aggregated state shape 1.17 0.11 0.37 0.05
State mean level 0.32 0.10 0.28 0.06
State shape 0.22 0.04 0.21 0.02
Variance components
Intercept 1.01 0.13 0.54 0.07
Slope (shape aggregated state) 0.65 0.24 0.16 0.05
Slope (shape state) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Residual variances
distressed/enthusiastic 3.61 0.42 1.98 0.23
upset/excited 3.89 0.44 2.16 0.24
guilty/strong 1.16 0.15 1.11 0.13
scared/interested 1.29 0.16 0.85 0.11
hostile/proud 1.95 0.23 1.08 0.16
irritable/alert 1.93 0.23 0.85 0.11
ashamed/inspired 1.47 0.18 0.74 0.10
nervous/determined 1.72 0.22 1.31 0.15
jittery/attentive 1.44 0.19 0.58 0.07
afraid/active 0.86 0.12 0.72 0.09
 p  .05.
Figure 4. Results from multilevel modeling: Explained variance in trait
report negative and positive affect at pretest, separately for mean levels and
profiles; predictors: state and aggregated state affect; unique state refers to
the variance in trait affect that was predicted uniquely by state affect in
multiple regression analysis that included state and aggregated state as
predictors; unique aggregated state affect refers to the variance in trait
affect was predicted uniquely by the aggregated state measure, and shared
refers to the predictive variance that was shared among the two predictors





































































































945TRAIT AND STATE AFFECT
not only provides cues for peoples’ global evaluations of well-
being—it not only functions like rose-colored glasses—but it also
influences their complex image of their personal affective systems.
These findings concur with theoretical notions on the link be-
tween affective states and judgments: both with the idea that
feelings inform global judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 2007) and
with the affect priming model, which proposes the facilitated
access to mood-congruent material in memory (Bower, 1981; Isen
et al., 1978). Moreover, these findings corroborate findings of two
studies revealing naturally occurring state effects on trait affect
(Eid & Diener, 2004; Eid et al., 1994). The design and analytical
procedures of this study render it highly unlikely that the observed
effects of state affect on trait report reflect trait-like components in
the state measure because it was possible to adjust for these
components by means of the aggregated state measure.
It is highly surprising that prior theoretical and empirical sup-
port for confounds of state and trait affect measures has not
attracted sufficient attention to question the validity of existing
trait affect assessment routines—single-occasion assessments of
trait affect are still the norm. Ideally, the strong evidence on the
blurred distinction between state and trait measures of affect
provided by this study will stimulate a change in measurement
procedures.
Implications of Findings
Our findings have numerous implications. Most importantly,
measures of trait affect (e.g., PANAS), if administered on a single
occasion, are nonoptimal to assess traits because they are con-
founded by states. The common practice of measuring affect once
using a trait measure may bias results as follows: (a) If the affect
measure is the criterion variable in, for example, a study on
long-term effects of traumatic events, the true association between
events and affect may be underestimated because of trait report
variance that is due to concurrent influences. (b) Concurrent as-
sociations between trait affect and related variables (e.g., chronic
stress) may be overestimated if the state influences the ratings on
both scales similarly. Currently feeling sad may result in evaluat-
ing global affect and chronic stress level as more negative than
when feeling happy. (c) Intraindividual trajectories of trait-level
affect spanning across critical life periods such as terminal decline
cannot be predicted well because of unwanted state variance in the
trait measure. (d) Evaluations of interventions may come to the
wrong conclusions if systematic state variance impacts on trait
ratings (e.g., if situational factors differentially influence different
experimental groups, that is, in terms of history effects as threats
to internal validity; cf. Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). (e)
Finally, and regarding the shape effect, findings on the underlying
structure of affect may be biased if variations on trait measures
also reflect state variation. For example, the PANAS has often
been applied across age groups, normal and clinical populations,
and countries to ascertain its construct validity (Leue & Beauducel,
2011). If the measures confound state and trait, insights about
affect structure are not clearly attributable to state or trait, but
represent a mixture of both. Moreover, the dimensionality of
trait-level affect may be overestimated if the contribution of state
affect is large because the dimensionality of state affect variability
is probably higher than that of traits (Zelenski & Larsen, 2000).
Analogous arguments can be made against measuring states on
single occasions. The contribution of trait to state affect cannot be
determined if state affect is measured on single occasions, and
associations between state affect and other variables may be under-
or overestimated.
The present results and theoretical considerations highlight the
need for study designs and statistical methods that overcome the
shortcomings of one-shot assessments. Central to more valid de-
signs is the repeated observation of the phenomena of interest and
the inclusion of trait and state measures that provide complemen-
tary information. This conclusion is compatible with suggestions
in trait research to use repeated measurements to isolate stable
from transient variance (Anusic, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2012;
Chmielewski & Watson, 2009). Latent state–trait models (e.g.,
Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999) can be used to model state and trait
components of repeated observations. Moreover, aggregating in-
formation across occasions—trait or state reports—reduces state
variance components (e.g., Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).
Limitations and Future Directions
Some of this study’s findings require elaboration and some
procedural aspects could be reconsidered in future studies. First,
we report exact percentages of bias (Figure 4; e.g., the state effect
on mean level trait ratings is 11%). These values will certainly
vary across studies, depending on study procedures such as the
nature of the measures or on the population under study. For
example, this study used the PANAS, an instrument that only
samples high arousal affective states. Very likely, the shape effects
would have been stronger if a larger range of states had been
measured because this would allow more precise capture of phe-
nomenologically distinct affective experiences. Relatedly, this
study measured trait affect with a frequency and state affect with
an intensity measure, respectively. This may have led to an un-
derestimation of the shared variance between state, aggregated
state, and trait. On the other hand, as it is difficult to determine the
frequency of affective states over the past year, current intensity
was potentially a particularly good heuristic for the global evalu-
ation. Finally, we did not account for measurement error as we
modeled associations at the manifest level. Thereby, we may have
even underestimated the influence of state on trait affect. Together,
the scope of the bias will vary depending on the range of states
under investigation, on the type of measure (frequency or inten-
sity), and on analytical procedures.
The extent to which state affect biases affective trait reports is
most likely also a function of contextual variation within and
across studies. Whether judgments are based on a precise analysis
of circumstances or whether they are more global, reflecting on a
current overall feeling depends on how people feel at a specific
moment (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Isen, Daubman, & Now-
icki, 1987). These two processing modes, analytic and heuristic,
are differentially associated with negative and positive affect.
Whereas discomfort is accompanied by more careful thinking,
feeling happy signals the absence of threats—effortful thinking is
not required and judgments can be based on simple heuristics
(Schwarz, 1990). Trait ratings should, therefore, be less biased
when negative affect is enhanced. For example, measuring trait
affect in summer in high school students who have just graduated
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trait affect because the students are in a happy state. Measuring
trait affect again in these subjects 0.5 years later, in winter, just
before they are about to take some exams at college would prob-
ably evince lower ratings of trait affect. Observing change in trait
affect here may simply reflect the difference between a positively
biased versus realistic evaluation of one’s global affectivity.
Third, there are multiple ways to determine the similarity of
profiles (e.g., Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). An interesting recent line
of research distinguishes between the normativeness (the degree to
which a profile reflects an average profile) and the distinctiveness
of a profile (the deviation of a profile from the normative profile;
Furr, 2008). This distinction reveals another approach to examin-
ing the similarity between state and trait profiles on a specific
occasion. Repeated sampling of the trait report and state affect
would enable the calculation of the trait and state profile distinc-
tiveness at each occasion. The within-day correlation of these
distinctive profiles would then also reveal state effects on trait
reports. In view of the lack of repeated trait report measurements
in the present investigation, this remains a task for future research.
Conclusion
The present results demonstrate that the exclusive reliance on a
one-shot assessment of trait report is nonoptimal to capture indi-
vidual differences in trait affect. This is not surprising—there are
limitations to what people can tell researchers about themselves on
any particular scale at any given occasion, and we have theoretical
insights about these limitations, and about the interconnections
among trait reports, states, and aggregated states. Yet it is surpris-
ing that single-occasion assessments of trait affect are still the
norm in psychological, sociological, and medical research. Given
theoretical knowledge, prior empirical findings, and this study’s
direct and strong evidence on state–trait confounds of mean level
and also shapes of affective experiences, we suggest it is high time
to use designs and statistical models that articulate the various
levels and facets of subjective affective experiences, and investi-
gate their shared and unique influences on real-life outcomes.
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